Abstract: In this paper, we formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered nominal contracts, in which households and Þrms use optimal Þltering to disentangle persistent and transitory shifts in the monetary policy rule. The calibrated model accounts quite well for the dynamics of output and inßation during the Volcker disinßation, and implies a sacriÞce ratio very close to the estimated value. Our approach indicates that inßation persistence and substantial costs of disinßation can be generated in an optimizing-agent framework, without relaxing the assumption of rational expectations or relying on arbitrary modiÞcations to the aggregate supply relation.
1 Introduction * Since the pioneering work of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) , business cycle dynamics and the role of monetary policy have been analyzed in models with staggered nominal contracts. In recent years, such contracts have been incorporated into dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models derived from microeconomic foundations.
1 Nevertheless, models with staggered contracts have been criticized for failing to generate a sufficient degree of inßation persistence and for implying unrealistically low costs of disinßation (Ball 1994; Fuhrer and Moore 1995) .
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In this paper, we formulate a DGE model with optimizing agents and staggered nominal contracts, and we show that this model can generate inßation persistence and substantial output costs of disinßation when private agents have limited information about the central bank's objectives.
3 In particular, households and Þrms use optimal Þltering to disentangle persistent shifts in the inßation target from transitory disturbances to the monetary policy rule. Under these assumptions, the speed at which private agents recognize a new inßation target depends on the transparency and credibility of the central bank. Thus, the signal-to-noise ratio is the key parameter determining the persistence of inßation forecast errors, and hence inßuencing the persistence of actual inßation and output.
We show that this model can account quite well for the dynamics of output and inßation during the Volcker disinßation. Using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we calibrate the signal-to-noise ratio to match the observed evolution of one-year-ahead inßation forecasts over the period 1980:4-1985:4 . With four-quarter wage and price contracts and an empirically reasonable calibration of capital adjustment costs, the model implies output costs of about 1.6 percentage points for each percentage point reduction in the inßation rate; this sacriÞce ratio is remarkably close to the estimated value for the Volcker disinßation.
Our analysis contrasts sharply with existing approaches for generating inßation persistence and substantial costs of disinßation. First, we avoid arbitrary departures * We appreciate comments and suggestions from Larry Christiano, Mike Dotsey, Marty Eichenbaum, Charlie Evans, Marvin Goodfriend, Dale Henderson, Peter Ireland, Athanasios Orphanides, John Taylor, Alex Wolman, and participants in workshops at the July 2000 NBER Summer Institute, the Federal Reserve Board, the European Central Bank, and the Richmond Federal Reserve Bank. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reßecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.
1 Lucas (1986) analysed a DGE model with staggered price contracts of Þxed duration, while Levin (1989) analyzed a DGE model with staggered wage contracts of this type. For recent examples, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , King and Wolman (1999) , and Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) . 2 The same criticism applies to models with quadratic costs of price adjustment (cf. Rotemberg 1996; Kim 2000) , which have similar Þrst-order dynamic properties to models with staggered nominal contracts.
3 Our approach is similar in spirit to that of Ball (1995) , who used a small structural model to show that imperfect credibility can raise the output costs of disinßation, and to that of Ireland (1995 Ireland ( , 1997 , who analyzed optimal disinßation paths using a highly stylized DGE framework but did not focus on the quantitative implications.
from the optimizing-agent framework, such as adding lagged inßation terms to the aggregate supply relation or imposing adaptive rather than rational expectations.
4 Our assumption that agents process information efficiently is consistent with the Þndings of Evans and Wachtel (1993) , who analyzed survey data on inßation expectations and demonstrated that persistent ex post forecast errors during the period 1968-85 should not be viewed as "irrational" but rather as reßecting the degree of uncertainty about the underlying inßation regime.
Second, our analysis implies that inßation persistence is not an inherent characteristic of the economy but rather varies with the stability and transparency of the monetary policy regime. As discussed below, this perspective is consistent with empirical evidence indicating very high U.S. inßation persistence (close to that of a random walk) during the period 1965-84 and much lower persistence during the remainder of the postwar period. In contrast, the empirical evidence appears to be inconsistent with models that incorporate inherent inßation persistence due to contract structure or adaptive expectations.
Finally, in our model, the costs of disinßation are radically diminished if agents quickly recognize the shift in the inßation target, whereas the learning rate is of relatively minor importance in models with inherent inßation persistence.
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More generally, our approach suggests that efforts to enhance transparency and credibility can facilitate the effectiveness of monetary stablilization policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews several important stylized facts, and highlights the credibility problems faced by the Federal Reserve during the Volcker disinßation. Section 3 presents our model, while Section 4 describes the calibration and solution methods. Section 5 investigates the model's simulated responses to a disinßation shock. Section 6 compares our approach to accounting for inßation persistence to the previous literature. Section 7 provides conclusions and suggests directions for future research.
Key Stylized Facts
In this section, we brießy characterize the persistence properties of postwar U.S. inßation, and then we highlight several key aspects of the Volcker disinßation. We interpret large and persistent inßation forecast errors as largely attributable to the Federal Reserve's lack of credibility following the unstable policies of the 1970s and the early abandonment of the initial monetary tightening of October 1979.
4 See the discussion in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) . For example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) obtained substantial costs of disinßation using an estimated version of the overlapping relative real wage contract speciÞcation of Buiter and Jewitt (1981) , but that speciÞcation is inconsistent with standard micro-founded models of wage and price determination (cf. Roberts 1997) . An alternative approach is to assume that some private agents have adaptive expectations; cf. Roberts (1998 Roberts ( , 2001 , Ball (2000) , and Ireland (2000) . 5 In models with intrinsic inßation persistence, BomÞm et al. (1997) and Huh and Lansing (2000) Þnd that the credibility of the central bank has relatively small effects on the costs of disinßation.
The Dynamic Properties of U.S. Inßation
Figure 1 depicts the postwar evolution of the U.S. GDP price inßation rate (that is, the annualized one-quarter inßation rate of the chain-weighted GDP price deßator). From this Þgure, it is apparent that inßation exhibited relatively high persistence between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s: annual average inßation rose progressively from 2 percent to around 10 percent in 1980, and then fell to about 4 percent by the end of the Volcker disinßation. Our analysis focuses on explaining the dynamics of inßation during the latter period, while leaving an explanation of the 1965-79 period to future research.
6
Interestingly, while U.S. inßation appears to have followed a random walk over roughly the 1965-84 period, the inßation rate exhibits much less persistence prior to 1965 and after about 1984. These shifts in inßation persistence have been documented using several different econometric approaches. For example, Taylor (2000) found that the largest autoregressive root of inßation has a 95 percent conÞdence interval of {0.94, 1.05} for the years 1960-79, compared with a conÞdence interval of {0.50, 0.86} for the years 1982-99.
7 Similar conclusions have been reached by Evans and Wachtel (1993) , who estimated a Markov regime-switching model of inßation, and by Cogley and Sargent (2001) , who analyzed a vector autoregression with time-varying parameters. Thus, a high degree of inßation persistence does not seem to be an inherent characteristic of the U.S. economy. As we will see below, our approach is consistent with this evidence, because our model exhibits moderate persistence when monetary policy is transparent and credible, and much higher persistence when agents must use signal extraction to make inferences about the central bank's inßation target.
A Brief Chronology of the Volcker Disinßation
In October 1979, newly appointed Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker announced a major shift in policy aimed at reducing the inßation rate. Volcker desired this policy change to be interpreted as a decisive break from past policies that had permitted inßation to rise to double-digit levels. As shown in Figure 2 , the federal funds rate increased about 6 percentage points between October 1979 and April 1980, an unprecedented rise over such a short period. The contractionary effect of high real interest rates was reinforced by the implemention of extensive credit controls in March 1980. In response, GDP contracted at an annual rate of nearly 9 percent in 1980:2, the steepest one-quarter decline in the postwar period. Alarmed by the apparent free fall in output, the Federal Reserve quickly lowered interest rates: by mid-1980, short-term nominal and real interest rates fell slightly below their values prior to the October 1979 tightening.
In late 1980, the Federal Reserve embarked on a new round of monetary tightening. The federal funds rate rose to 20 percent by early 1981, implying an ex post real interest rate of about 10 percent. Real interest rates were maintained near this extraordinarily high level until mid-1982. Volcker's aggressive anti-inßation policy succeeded in reducing the inßation rate from a 10 percent peak in late 1980 to around 4 percent by mid-1983, albeit at the cost of the most severe contraction in post-war U.S. history. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the output gap as measured by the OECD. Based on this measure of the output gap, the Volcker disinßation was associated with a sacriÞce ratio of 1.7 percent. Figure 4 shows the four-quarter average inßation rate of the GDP price deßator and its expected value four quarters ahead (as measured by the median projection of the Survey of Professional Forecasters). The behavior of actual inßation and expected inßation seem consistent with the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve faced severe credibility problems in its efforts to reduce inßation. Despite the transient policy tightening that began in October 1979, both actual and expected inßation continued to rise over the next nine months. After renewed Federal Reserve tightening in late 1980, survey-based measures of expected inßation Þnally began to fall, suggesting somewhat greater conÞdence in the Fed's commitment to this policy stance. Nevertheless, realized inßation fell much more rapidly than was predicted, implying large and persistent inßation forecast errors (also shown in Figure 4 ).
Inßation Forecast Errors and Credibility
9 From 1981 to 1985, these forecast errors averaged over 1.5 percentage points. Figure 5 shows two measures of long-term expected inßation (the Barclay survey of inßation expectations 5-10 years ahead, and the Philadelphia Federal Reserve survey of the expected 10-year average inßation rate). Both of these surveys indicate that long-term inßation expectations adjusted even more slowly.
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In light of these data, it appears that individuals did revise their inßation expectations in response to shifts in monetary policy, rather than simply adapting to current and lagged inßation rates. In particular, expected inßation began to decline in late 1980, whereas actual inßation did not begin to decline until early 1981. In fact, ex-8 The sacriÞce ratio is estimated by dividing the cumulative undiscounted sum of the annualized output gap between 1980:H2 and 1984:H2 by the change in the inßation rate of the GDP deßator over the same period. For this calculation, we use the output gap series taken from the OECD Economic Outlook. Our estimate is close to the value of 1.8 obtained by Ball (1994b) . Nevertheless, it should be recognized that estimated sacriÞce ratios are somewhat sensitive to the speciÞc measure of the output gap. For example, Sachs (1985) , Blinder (1987) , and Mankiw (1991) obtained somewhat higher estimates of the sacriÞce ratio for the Volcker disinßation.
9 The inßation forecast error in any quarter t is measured as the difference between expected inßation in period t and the realized inßation rate over the forecast period. Thus, the inßation forecast error shown in 1980:4 reßects the error in predicting the year-over-year inßation rate in 1981:4.
10 Goodfriend (1993) draws attention to the slow convergence of long-term nominal interest rates. He interprets the temporary spike in nominal interest rates in 1983 as reßecting a continued lack of faith on the part of market participants in the Federal Reserve's willingness to maintain a tight hold on inßation.
pected inßation remained below the current inßation rate throughout the subsequent year.
Furthermore, we interpret the persistent positive forecast errors reßecting substantial doubts about whether the Federal Reserve would continue to pursue a disinßa-tionary policy. As Goodfriend (1993) has emphasized, such doubts were reasonably well-founded, given that the Federal Reserve had shown a high degree of tolerance for rising inßation in the 1970s and had aborted the monetary tightening that began in October 1979. A second capitulation became increasingly plausible as the severity of the 1982 recession became more apparent and generated mounting Congressional pressure. The forecasting problem was compounded by the fact that the Federal Reserve did not announce a target path or band for the inßation rate; indeed, as the disinßation progressed, it became increasing difficult to assess how far Volcker intended to push down the inßation rate. Thus, persistent forecast errors seem consistent with rational expectations subject to limited information, and do not necessarily reßect non-rational expectations.
Evidence from Other Countries
Although our analysis is primarily devoted to matching the behavior of the U.S. economy during the Volcker disinßation, it is interesting to note that similar patterns appear to be characteristic of the roughly contemporaneous disinßation episodes in the United Kingdom and Canada. As seen in Figure 6 , the United Kingdom's shift towards an aggressive inßation-reduction strategy in 1981 succeeded in reducing the inßation rate from a peak of 20 percent in mid-1980 to around 5 percent by mid-1983.
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Similarly, as shown in Figure 7 , Canada's adoption of tighter policies in 1981 contributed to a fall in its inßation rate from double digit levels to around 3-4 percent by late-1983. 12 As in the Volcker disinßation, both the U.K. and Canadian disinßations were associated with large and highly persistent inßation forecast errors. Moreover, the estimated sacriÞce ratio for each country (1.4 for the United Kingdom and 1.3 for Canada) appear very similar to the estimate of 1.7 for the Volcker disinßation.
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The Model
As in Erceg (1997) , we assume that labor and product markets each exhibit monopolistic competition, that wages and prices are determined by staggered four-quarter nominal contracts, and that the capital stock is endogenously determined subject to 11 See Sargent (1986) for discussion of the initial stages of the Thatcher disinßation. 12 The inßation rate for the United Kingdom is the four quarter-change in the GDP price deßator, while the inßation rate for Canada is the four quarter-change in the GNP price deßator. The data on expected inßation are semiannual, and taken from successive issues of the OECD Economic Outlook. The inßation forecast reported in the Þrst half of each year is taken from the December survey of the previous year, and represents the inßation rate expected to prevail over the subsequent four quarters; the inßation forecast reported in the second half of each year is taken from the mid-year survey (typically published in June or July).
quadratic adjustment costs.
13 The central bank is assumed to react to the deviation of the output price inßation rate from its target value, and to the growth rate of real output. The key assumption in our analysis is that the central bank's long-run inßation target cannot be directly observed by private agents.
Firms and Price Setting
Final Goods Production As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000) , we assume that households use a single Þnal output good Y t either for consumption or investment. A continuum of differentiated intermediate goods
is transformed into the Þnal output good using a constant returns-to-scale technology of the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
where θ p > 0.
Firms that produce the Þnal output good are perfectly competitive in both product and factor markets. Thus, Þnal goods producers minimize the cost of producing a given quantity of the output index Y t , taking as given the price P t (f ) of each intermediate good Y t (f ). Moreover, the Þnal output good is sold at a price P t that equals the marginal cost of production:
It is natural to interpret P t as the aggregate price index.
Intermediate Goods Production Each intermediate good Y t (f) is produced by a single monopolistically competitive Þrm. This Þrm faces a demand function that varies inversely with its output price P t (f ) and directly with aggregate demand Y t :
Each intermediate goods producer utilizes capital services K t (f ) and a labor index L t (f) (deÞned below) to produce its respective output good.
The form of the production function is Cobb-Douglas, with the level of total factor productivity X t identical across Þrms:
Firms face perfectly competitive factor markets for hiring capital and the labor index. Thus, each Þrm chooses K t (f ) and L t (f ), taking as given both the rental price of capital R Kt and the aggregate wage index W t (deÞned below). Firms can costlessly adjust either factor of production. Thus, the standard static Þrst-order conditions for cost minimization imply that all Þrms have identical marginal cost per unit of output. By implication, aggregate marginal cost MC t can be expressed as a function of the wage index W t , the aggregate labor index L t , the aggregate capital stock K t , and total factor productivity X t , or equivalently, as the ratio of the wage index to the marginal product of labor MP L t :
We assume that the prices of the intermediate goods are determined by staggered nominal contracts of Þxed duration. For concreteness, we assume that each price contract lasts four quarters, and that one-fourth of the Þrms reset their prices in a given period. Thus, individual producers may be indexed so that every Þrm with index f ∈ [0, 0.25] resets its contract price P t (f) whenever the date t is evenly divisible by 4; similarly, Þrms with index f ∈ [0.25, 0.5] set prices during periods in which mod(t, 4) = 1, and so forth. For a Þrm which resets its price during period t, P t+j (f ) = P t (f ) for j = 1, 2, 3. The Þrm chooses the value of P t (f) which maximizes the Þrm's discounted proÞts over the life of the price contract, subject to its product demand curve (3):
The operator e E t represents the conditional expectation based on all information available to private agents at period t.
14 Note that the tilde above the expectations operator is meant to indicate that private agents do not have complete information about the central bank's policy rule. The Þrm's output is subsidized at a Þxed rate τ p . The Þrm discounts proÞts received at date t + j by the discount factor ψ t,t+j .
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The Þrst-order condition for a price-setting Þrm is
Roughly speaking, the Þrm sets its contract price so that its expected discounted nominal marginal revenue (inclusive of subsidies) is equal to its discounted nominal marginal cost. We assume that production is subsidized to eliminate the monopolistic distortion associated with a positive markup; that is, τ p = θ p .
Households and Wage Setting
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive households (indexed on the unit interval), each of which supplies a differentiated labor service to the production sector; that is, goods-producing Þrms regard each household's labor services N t (h), h ∈ [0, 1], as an imperfect substitute for the labor services of other households. It is convenient to assume that a representative labor aggregator (or "employment agency") combines households' labor hours in the same proportions as Þrms would choose. Thus, the aggregator's demand for each household's labor is equal to the sum of Þrms' demands. The labor index L t has the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
where θ w > 0. The aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate labor index, taking each household's wage rate W t (h) as given, and then sells units of the labor index to the production sector at their unit cost W t :
It is natural to interpret W t as the aggregate wage index. The aggregator's demand for the labor hours of household h -or equivalently, the total demand for this household's labor by all goods-producing Þrms -is given by
The utility functional of household h is
where the discount factor β satisÞes 0 < β < 1. The period utility function depends on consumption C t (h), leisure 1 − N t (h), and real money balances.
Mt(h) P t . Household h's budget constraint in period t states that its expenditure on goods and net purchases of Þnancial assets must equal its disposable income:
The household purchases the Þnal output good (at a price of P t ), which it chooses either to consume C t (h) or invest I t (h) in physical capital. Investment in physical capital augments the household's (end-of-period) capital stock K t+1 (h) according to a linear transition law of the form:
Financial asset accumulation consists of increases in money holdings and the net acquisition of state-contingent claims. Each element of δ t+1,t represents the current price of an asset that will pay one unit of currency if a particular state of nature occurs in the subsequent period, while the corresponding element of B t+1 (h) represents the quantity of such claims purchased by the household. B t (h) indicates the value of the household's claims given the current realization of the state of nature.
Household h's disposable income consists of a lump-sum government transfer T t (h) , labor income of (1 + τ w )W t (h) N t (h), and capital income net of adjustment costs. Pre-tax labor income W t (h) N t (h) is subsidized at a Þxed rate τ w .
16 Each household receives an aliquot share of the proÞts of all Þrms Γ t (h) , and gross rental income of R Kt K t (h) from renting its capital stock to Þrms. Households incur a cost of adjusting their net stock of physical capital. Adjustment costs are assumed to depend on the square of the deviation of the investment-to-capital ratio from its steady state level level of δ (or equivalently, on the square of the net change in the capital stock).
In every period t, each household maximizes the utility functional (12) with respect to its consumption, investment, (end-of-period) capital stock, money balances, and holdings of contingent claims, subject to its labor demand function (11) its budget constraint (13), and the transition equation for capital (14) .
The Þrst-order conditions for consumption and for holdings of state-contingent claims imply the familiar consumption Euler equation linking the marginal cost of foregoing a unit of consumption in the current period (Λ t = C −σ t ) to the expected discounted marginal beneÞt:
where the risk-free real interest rate R t is the rate of return on an asset that pays one unit of the output index under every state of nature at time t + 1, and the nominal interest rate I t is the rate of return on an asset that pays one unit of currency under every state of nature at time t + 1. Our assumption of complete contingent claims markets for consumption implies that consumption is identical across households in every period (C t (h) = C t ), and hence that all households have the same marginal value of a unit of the output index. This enables us to omit household-speciÞc subscripts.
The household's Euler condition for investment implies a linear contemporaneous relation between Tobin's q and the investment to capital ratio of the form:
Here q t is the current value to the household of a unit of capital that becomes productive in the following period (measured in units of the Þnal output good). Substituting this relation into the Euler equation for capital yields:
In the absence of adjustment costs, the household would simply accumulate capital until the expected real rental return equaled the marginal cost, including foregone interest and depreciation. Adjustment costs drive a wedge between the expected rental return and marginal cost that increases in the level of net investment.
Households set nominal wages in staggered contracts that are analogous to the price contracts described above. In particular, we assume that wage contracts last four periods, and that the households are divided into four cohorts of equal size. In each period, the households in one cohort renegotiate their wage contracts, while the nominal wages of all other households remain unchanged. Thus, for a household which resets its contract wage W t (h) during period t, W t+j (h) = W t (h) for j = 1, 2, 3. The household chooses the value of W t (h) to maximize its utility functional (12), yielding the following Þrst-order condition:
The discount factor
represents the current marginal utility of an additional dollar received j periods in the future. Roughly speaking, equation (18) says that the household chooses its contract wage to equate the present discounted value of working an additional unit of time to the discounted marginal cost.
We assume that employment is subsidized to eliminate the monopolistic distortion associated with a positive markup; that is, τ w = θ w . If contracts last only one period, this condition reduces to the familiar equality between the real wage and marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure.
Monetary Policy
The appropriate characterization of Federal Reserve policy during the Volker disinßation period remains a subject of contention. However, Goodfriend (1991 Goodfriend ( , 1993 argues persuasively that it is reasonable to consider the federal funds rate as the best measure of the stance of U.S. monetary policy even during this period.
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Based on this 17 From 1979:4 to 1982:3, the Federal Reserve's stated operational target involved the stock of nonborrowed reserves. Nevertheless, as Cook (1989) and Goodfriend (1991 Goodfriend ( , 1993 have emphasized, the federal funds rate remained the main instrument of monetary policy, because the Federal Reserve made numerous discretionary adjustments to inßuence the amount of credit extended through the perspective, we assume that the central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate so that the ex post real interest rate rises when inßation exceeds its target value of π * t , or output growth rises above its trend rate. In addition, as in much of the subsequent literature, we allow for some degree of nominal interest rate smoothing or policy inertia. In particular, monetary policy is described by the following interest rate reaction function:
where the four-quarter average inßation rate π
P 3 j=0 π t−j , r is the steady-state real interest rate, andḡ y is the steady-state output growth rate. Note that this interest rate reaction function involves the output growth rate and not the level of the output gap; as discussed below, this speciÞcation is consistent with our empirical analysis of interest rate determination from 1980 through 1985.
We assume that the inßation target π * t varies over time due to a combination of transitory and highly persistent shocks. Households and Þrms are assumed to know the form of the central bank's reaction function, including the parameters determining the sensitivity of the nominal interest rate to the inßation rate, the output growth rate, and the lagged interest rate (that is, the parameters γ π , γ y , and γ i , respectively). While agents can infer the current value of the inßation target from knowledge of the central bank's reaction function, they cannot directly observe the underlying components of π * t . Thus, agents must solve a signal extraction problem in order to forecast the future path of the inßation target, which in turn inßuences the outcome of their current decisions (e.g., in setting new wage and price contracts).
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In our baseline speciÞcation, we formulate the signal extraction problem by assuming that the central bank's inßation target is the sum of a constant steady state rate of inßation π and two zero-mean stochastic components. Equivalently: 
discount window. On this basis, prominent monetarists such as Friedman (1983) and Brunner (1983) criticized the Federal Reserve's failure to adopt a strict monetarist approach.
For simplicity, we assume that the highly persistent component (π pt − π) has an autoregressive root ρ p arbitrarily close to unity, while the transitory component π qt has a much smaller autoregressive root ρ q . Thus, while we assume the central bank's inßation target eventually returns to its steady state value of π, the shock ε pt drives the inßation target away from steady state for a very prolonged period. On the other hand, the shock ε qt has only a very transient effect on the target.
Finally, we assume that the inßation target innovations ε pt and ε qt are mutually uncorrelated with variances v 1 and v 2 , respectively, and are not correlated with any other shocks to the model economy. Thus, the Kalman Þlter can be used to obtain an optimal solution to the signal-extraction problem. In particular, optimal estimates of the unobserved components can be obtained recursively as follows:
where the Kalman gain matrix K gain = F L gain . The term π * t − HF e E t−1 ξ t−1 is the one-step-ahead forecast error in predicting π * t based on its previous values, while the matrix L gain determines how agents respond to a given forecast error by updating their estimates of the underlying components of the inßation target. Finally, given the current estimate e E t ξ t of these components, the optimal forecast of the inßation target J periods ahead is given by:
Solution and Calibration
To analyze the behavior of this model, we log-linearize the model's equations around the non-stochastic steady state associated with a constant inßation rate of π (that is, the central bank's steady-state inßation target). Nominal variables, such as the contract price and wage, are rendered stationary by suitable transformations. The log-linearized model consists of four key behavioral equations (the Euler equations for consumption (15), the capital stock (17), price-setting (8), and wage-setting (18)), three equations determining actual monetary policy ((19) , (20), and (21)), and two equations determining private sector expectations of the inßation target ( (22) and (23)).
Parameters of Private Sector Behavioral Equations
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Thus, we assume that the discount factor β = .993, consistent with a steady-state annualized real interest rate r of about 3 percent. The utility function is assumed to be logarithmic in consumption, leisure, and real balances, implying that σ = χ = µ = 1. The Cobb-Douglas capital share parameter α = 0.3, and the depreciation rate of capital δ = .025 (consistent with an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent). The price and wage markup parameters are both set equal to 1/3, so θ P = θ W = 1/3. We set the steady state inßation rate π equal to an annual rate of four percent. We draw on the empirical q-theory literature to calibrate a baseline value of the capital adjustment cost parameter φ K . Recent literature estimating a linear regression of It Kt on q t -consistent with equation (16) in our model -includes Eberly (1997) and Cummins, Haskett, and Oliner (1997) . Eberly's estimates using U.S. data of the regression coefficient on q t range from 0.09 (ordinary least squares) to 0.17 (instrumental variables), implying values of φ K of 11.1 and 5.6, respectively. Cummins, Haskett, and Oliner estimate regression coefficients on q t ranging from .08 (ordinary least squares) to .11 (instrumental variables), implying values of φ K of 12.5 and 9, respectively. We set our baseline value of φ K = 6, near the lower bound of the range of estimates of adjustment costs suggested by this literature. Our choice is in part motivated by the fact that difficulty in measuring Tobins's q is likely to lead to upward bias in estimates of adjustment costs using the standard q-theory approach (as suggested by Shapiro (1986) ).
19 However, we also conduct sensitivity analysis in the results presented below.
Monetary Policy Rule Parameters
The parameters of the interest rate reaction function (19) are estimated over the 1980:4-1985:4 period by two-stage least squares. In estimating this equation, we assume that the Federal Reserve maintained a constant value of π pt throughout this period; that is, we identify the error term in the estimated monetary policy reaction function as arising solely from variation in π qt (the transitory component of the inßa-tion target). We use two-stage least squares (with lagged values of inßation, output growth, and the nominal interest rate as instruments) to correct for possible correlation between the error term and the contemporaneous four-quarter inßation rate and output growth rate; in practice, however, OLS and 2SLS give reasonably similar results over the estimation period. We obtain parameter estimates of γ π = 0.64, γ y = 0.25, and γ i = 0.21. We also experimented with adding the level of the output gap to the interest rate reaction function, but found that this variable was not statistically signiÞcant.
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Figure 8 compares the actual federal funds rate with the Þtted values implied by these coefficient estimates. Evidently, this simple speciÞcation performs remarkably well in describing monetary policy during the sample period: the estimated residuals are relatively small compared with the movements in the federal funds rate itself, and these residuals exhibit negligible serial correlation.
21
19 Our baseline choice of φ K = 6 implies that the half-life of the response of the aggregate capital stock to a one percent permanent rise in the real interest rate (under perfect foresight) is about 14 quarters, assuming that aggregate labor hours are held Þxed.
20 Interestingly, Orphanides and Wieland (1998) estimated the interest rate reaction function over a longer period (1980:1 to 1996:4), and found that the level of output and lag of the level of output entered with a nearly equal but opposite sign. 21 The monetary policy reaction function appears quite stable even over short very subsamples of Volker's tenure, at least for estimation periods beginning at or around the period of renewed
Evolution of the Inßation Target
We set the autoregressive parameter ρ p on the highly persistent component of the inßation target (π pt − π) equal to 0.999, while the autoregressive parameter ρ q is set equal to zero in our baseline.
The latter choice is consistent with our empirical Þnding that the historical innovations in the monetary policy reaction function over the 1980:4-1985:4 period are close to white noise.
Under these assumptions, the expected future inßation target e E t π * t+j (j > 0) depends only on a constant (π) and the expectation of the highly persistent component of the target e E t (π pt+j ). In this special case of equation (22) with ρ q = 0, the persistent component of the target evolves according to:
Thus, agents update their assessment of the persistent component of the inßation target by the product of the forecast error innovation and a constant coefficient. This coefficient, which is proportional to the scalar Kalman gain parameter k g , is an increasing function of the signal-to-noise ratio
(the ratio of the variances of the persistent and transitory components of the inßation target).
In estimating the signal-to-noise ratio, we utilize the same assumptions described above, namely, that the Federal Reserve maintained a constant value of π pt after 1980:4, so that the path of the transient component π qt can be computed from the residuals in the estimated monetary policy rule. We proceed by minimizing the sum of squared deviations between the observed data on four quarter-ahead expected inßa-tion over the period 1980:4 to 1985:4 (taken from Survey of Professional Forecasters) and the corresponding inßation expectations implied by our model. Our point estimate of
implies a value of the Kalman gain of 0.13. Thus, using equation (24), we Þnd that nearly half of a given change in π pt is incorporated into agents'expectations within a year.
Results
In this section, we analyze the behavior of the calibrated model in response to a shock to the highly persistent component π pt of the inßation target. In particular, we assume that π pt falls from an initial value of 10 percent to its steady-state level of 4 percent (annual rates); this shock is roughly equal to the decline in the GDP price inßation rate during the Volcker disinßation. The shock is assumed to occur in 1980:4.
The Baseline Calibrated Model
Full Information about the Inßation Target. The dashed lines in Figure 9 show the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the model when private agents have full infortightening in late 1980. mation about the central bank's inßation target; that is, agents correctly interpret the reduction in the inßation target as a persistent shock and have perfect foresight about the subsequent path of π * t . Inßation falls from 10 percent to 4 percent within a year, and exhibits very little persistence beyond the length of the four-quarter nominal contracts. The short-term nominal interest rate falls slightly in the initial period (1980:4) and is close to steady state within a couple of quarters. Real output initially declines markedly, but rebounds above baseline shortly thereafter. The initial output contraction occurs because the estimated monetary policy rule implies a sharp jump in the ex ante real interest rate. However, given that inßation expectations are anchored by the new lower target, progress in reducing inßation allows nominal and real interest rates to fall quickly and thereby causes output to rebound.
These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by Ball (1994) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995) . Although those authors utilized models with staggered price contracts and ßexible wages, it is clear that the inclusion of staggered wage contracts in our model does not generate much additional inßation persistence. Furthermore, while the output costs of disinßation depend on the sensitivity of real marginal cost to output and on the form of the monetary policy reaction function, these factors have minimal effect on the duration of a disinßation episode when agents have full information about the shift in the inßation target.
Imperfect Observability of the Inßation Target. The solid lines in Figure 9 show the IRFs of the baseline version of the calibrated model; that is, the signal-to-noise ratio is set to its estimated value (implying a Kalman gain of 0.13), and hence private agents gradually learn about the persistent shock to the inßation target. It is evident from Figure 9 that the signal extraction problem plays a critical role in accounting for the broad features of the Volcker disinßation episode, namely, sluggish inßation adjustment, a persistently negative output gap, and an initial rise in the nominal interest rate. Inßation exhibits much greater persistence in this case: only about half the decline in inßation occurs within a year, and inßation is still only 3/4 of the way toward steady state after two years. Our model's predicted path for inßation in the six quarters following the shock is in fact very close to what was observed in the Volcker disinßation. The slow inßation decline in our model reßects that current inßation is partly anchored by expectations about the future inßation target.
In this case, the output gap exhibits a substantial and persistent decline, which contrasts strongly with the results for the case in which private agents have complete information about the inßation target. In particular, since current inßation decreases slowly, the policy rule requires high ex ante real interest rates over a sustained period. Output is about four percent below potential during the Þrst year after the disinßation shock, and only recovers gradually as the central bank reduces interest rates in response to falling inßation. Thus, our calibrated model yields a sacriÞce ratio of about 1.6 during the Þve years after the disinßation shock, a result which is remarkably close to the empirical estimate of 1.7, and broadly in line with the estimates for Canada and the United Kingdom discussed in Section 2.4.
Furthermore, the nominal interest rate rises initially by about 300 basis points, an implication that contrasts sharply with the results obtained under full information (for which the nominal interest rate starts falling immediately at the start of the disinßation). This difference in nominal interest rate behavior results from the greater sluggishness of inßation and because output exhibits a smaller initial contraction than under complete information.
Finally, while the signal-to-noise parameter is calibrated to Þt the four quarterahead expected inßation rate, it is interesting to note that our simple speciÞcation generates comovement of actual and expected inßation that is quite similar to that observed in the Volcker disinßation and in the roughly contemporaneous disinßation in the United Kingdom (cf. Figures 4 and 6, respectively) . Expected inßation falls sharply below current inßation at the announcement of the disinßation, but then declines somewhat more slowly thereafter. As emphasized in Section 2, this pattern clearly departs from what one would expect if private agents' expectations evolved in a simple adaptive fashion. In the medium term, inßation expectations move quite closely with actual inßation, demonstrating that persistent positive forecast errors are not inconsistent with rational expectations subject to limited information about the central bank's objectives.
Sensitivity Analysis
We now consider sensitivity analysis to assess the features of our model that help it to account for an empirically plausible sacriÞce ratio. One crucial feature is endogenous capital accumulation. Figure 10a shows the responses of output, consumption, and investment to the disinßation shock in the baseline calibrated model. Although the baseline investment share of output is only slightly over 20 percent, a sharp drop in investment accounts for nearly half of the output decline at the recession trough in the Þrst half of 1981.
As shown in Figure 10b , the magnitude of the output decline in our model (and hence the sacriÞce ratio) is somewhat sensitive to the calibration of the adjustment cost parameter φ K . The solid line depicts the response under our baseline calibration (φ K = 6). The dotted line depicts the case of extremely high adjustment costs (φ K = 100); in this case, investment does not respond at all, and the output response is sufficiently damped that the sacriÞce ratio is only 0.7 (less than half its baseline value). The dashed line depicts a reasonable upper bound on the magnitude of adjustment costs estimated in the q-theory literature (namely, φ K = 12), implying a half-life of over 5 years for the adjustment of the capital stock to a permanent rise in the real interest rate.
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With these relatively high adjustment costs, the output response is somewhat lower than under the baseline calibration, yielding a sacriÞce ratio of only 1.1. Finally, to take account of possible upward bias in the empirical q-theory literature, the dot-dashed line depicts relatively low adjustment costs (φ K = 2); in this case, the sacriÞce ratio rises to 2.2.
Nominal wage rigidity also raises the magnitude of the output response to the disinßation shock. The dashed line in Figure 10c indicates the output response with four-quarter price contracts and ßexible wages, while the solid line indicates the results for the baseline model (with four-quarter wage and price contracts). With ßexible wages, the model yields a sacriÞce ratio of only 1.0, compared with a sacriÞce ratio of 1.6 for the baseline model. Intuitively, nominal wage inertia reduces the sensitivity of real marginal cost to the output gap. Because price inßation depends on current and expected future real marginal costs, price inßation falls less in response to a given output gap as wages become less ßexible. Thus, in the context of a disinßation shock, nominal wage inertia implies that the real interest rate rises by a larger amount under the monetary policy rule (because price inßation remains further above target), and hence output declines more sharply relative to the case of completely ßexible wages.
Finally, the output response is somewhat sensitive to the inßation coefficient (γ π ) in the interest rate reaction function. To illustrate this sensitivity, we consider variants in which this coefficient is two standard deviations above or below its estimated value. The solid line indicates the response for the baseline calibrated model (γ π = 0.64), while the dashed line indicates a more aggressive response to the inßation rate (γ π = 1.05), and the dot-dashed line indicates a less aggressive policy response (γ π = 0.23). The output gap trough occurs at roughly the same date in all three cases, but the magnitude of the output contraction obviously increases with the aggressiveness of the policy response to deviations of inßation from target.
Inßation Forecast Errors
Our model's ability to generate inßation persistence clearly depends on highly autocorrelated expectational errors in forecasting the central bank's inßation target, and correspondingly in forecasting inßation itself. For our interpretation to be empirically plausible, it is essential that the magnitude of the forecast errors implied by our model should not markedly exceed the observed pattern during the Volcker disinßation. In fact, Figure 11 shows that the inßation forecast errors implied by our model tend to be considerably smaller than those implied by the data. The dotted line indicates the forecast errors implied by our model in response to a fall in the persistent component of the inßation target alone, while the dash-dotted line indicates the pattern of forecast errors if the historical monetary policy innovations are also included. In either case, the forecast errors implied by the model are bounded by the historical forecast errors throughout the Volcker disinßation (except in 1980:4, the initial period of the shock). Thus, our model does not require implausibly large forecast errors in order to explain a high degree of inßation persistence.
Interestingly, the historical data exhibit a considerably higher degree of persistence in inßation forecast errors compared with those implied by our model. In particular, while our simple speciÞcation of the inßation target process implies a geometric pattern of convergence in the inßation forecast errors, the observed forecast errors show little tendency to decline, even several years after the initiation of the disinßation. For example, short-run inßation expectations in early 1984 remained in the range of 5 percent, nearly 2 percentage points higher than the realized inßation rate. Moreover, survey data on long-term expected inßation show a considerably more sluggish decline than is implied by our calibrated model.
Output Persistence
We have shown that our model can account for a highly persistent downturn in the level of output in response to a disinßation, implying an empirically plausible sacriÞce ratio. However, even under imperfect observability, a disinßation has a highly frontloaded effect on the level of output, with the output trough occuring only two to three quarters after the shock. The path of output implied by our model in response to a disinßation shock is shown by the dotted line in Figure 12 (with the dash-dot line showing the model output path when the historical monetary policy innovation is also included). It is clear that the model implies a much more rapid downturn than actually occurred in the Volcker disinßation; in the historical episode, output reached a trough only in mid-1982, more than a year-and-a-half later than the monetary policy tightening. The rapid output response reßects that the expenditure components of output in our model show very little persistence in growth rate terms. As we have seen in Figure 10b , increasing the cost of adjusting the capital stock does not delay the timing of the investment trough, but simply dampens the response of investment expenditures.
Accounting for persistent effects of shocks on the growth rate of output is a challenge to a broad class of models with optimizing agents, and in our model, greater output persistence would certainly enhance its ability to account for the behavior of other endogenous variables. For example, with a sharp initial downturn in output, the nominal interest rate in our model does not peak as sharply as in the data. Although not shown here, we have found that output persistence is not substantially affected by incorporating habit persistence in consumption into the baseline model. In future research, it will be useful to consider these issues in models with timing lags in investment decisions (cf. Edge (2000b) ), which may be somewhat more successful in accounting for the delayed output downturns that seem to have characterized historical disinßation episodes.
Comparison with Existing Literature
As shown above, our formulation of staggered four-quarter wage and price contracts is useful in accounting for empirically reasonable costs of disinßation. In contrasting our approach with the existing literature, however, it is useful to consider the following stylized representation of the aggregate supply relation:
where π t is the one-quarter annualized inßation rate, x t is the deviation of output from its ßexible-price level, andπ t+1 is the one-step-ahead inßation forecast; in this speciÞcation, the parameters satisfy 0 < β ≤ 1 and λ > 0. Equation (25) is immediately recognizable as the workhorse New Keynesian Phillips Curve under the assumption that agents make rational inßation forecasts using all information at time t; that is,π t+1 = E t π t+1 , where we use the operator E t (without a tilde) to indicate that private agents have full information about monetary policy (including the central bank's inßation target). In particular, as shown by Yun (1996) and others, this equation can be derived from microeconomic foundations when prices are determined by Calvo-style contracts and wages are completely ßexible. This formulation exhibits no intrinsic inßation persistence and implies that disinßations can be conducted without any output costs.
One approach to accounting for inßation persistence has been to incorporate lagged inßation terms into equation (25) while maintaining the assumption that agents make rational forecasts (cf. Clarida et al. 1999 ):
When θ = 1/2 and β = 1, equation (26) can be viewed as representing overlapping two-period relative real wage contracts (cf. Buiter and Jewitt 1981) . As shown by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , this approach can account for very high inßation persistence and substantial costs of disinßation. Nevertheless, rigorous microeconomic foundations for this speciÞcation have not been provided; furthermore, as pointed out by Roberts (1997) , the relative real wage contract speciÞcation has unpalatable implications for the level of real wages. An alternative approach has been to assume that some agents do not have rational expectations. For example, Roberts (1998) considers a speciÞcation in which a fraction θ of private agents make one-step-ahead inßation forecasts based on past inßation, while the remaining agents have rational expectations; evidently, this speciÞcation can be represented exactly as in equation (26), but with a different structural interpretation than that of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) .
23 Of course, this approach departs from the optimizing-agent framework, in which agents use information efficiently in making their forecasts. Furthermore, as noted above, survey data on inßation expectations clearly incorporate additional information beyond that contained in lagged inßation data.
In contrast, our approach assumes that private agents have rational expectations but must use signal extraction to make inferences about the central bank's inßation target; that is, we assume thatπ t+1 = e E t π t+1 , where e E t indicates the rational forecast given all information available to private agents at time t. By deÞning u t = β ³ e E t π t+1 − E t π t+1´, we obtain the following aggregate supply relation:
Evidently, u t ≡ 0 in the New Keynesian model described above, whereas u t will contribute to inßation persistence in the case where private agents do not have full information about the central bank's inßation target.
We can obtain an analytic expression for the behavior of u t when aggregate demand is determined by the New Keynesian IS curve, the central bank follows a simpliÞed interest rate reaction function (involving only the current one quarter inßation rate and the current output gap), and the inßation target π * t is the sum of a random walk component π pt and a white noise component π qt .
24 In this case, we Þnd that u t follows the process
where φ < 0, κ g is the Kalman gain coefficient in the updating equation (24) for e E t π pt that applies when ρ p = 1, and recalling that ε pt is the innovation in the persistent component of the inßation target. In the case of full information about the inßation target, the Kalman gain κ g = 1, and hence u t = 0 as in the New Keynesian model; in this case, inßation exhibits no persistence, and disinßation does not involve any output costs. In contrast, a lower signal-to-noise ratio regarding the inßation target (and hence lower κ g ) is associated with higher volatility and persistence of u t , and this persistence passes through into the actual inßation process.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have formulated a DGE model with optimizing agents and staggered nominal contracts, in which private agents use optimal Þltering to make inferences about the central bank's inßation target. We have shown that this model accounts quite well for several important features of the Volcker disinßation episode: a pronounced initial rise in the nominal interest rate, a sluggish decline in the inßation rate, a persistently negative output gap, and persistent inßation forecast errors. In this framework, inßation persistence is not an inherent characteristic of the model economy, but rather arises whenever agents must learn about shifts in the monetary policy regime.
To avoid a non-linear signal extraction problem, we have assumed that private agents have complete information about the speciÞcation and coefficients of the monetary policy rule, and that the inßation target itself is the only aspect of monetary policy that is not fully observed. As noted above, however, the appropriate characterization of Federal Reserve policy during the Volcker disinßation period continues to be somewhat contentious even after two decades, and hence was almost certainly not as transparent to market participants at the time. In future research, it would be interesting to allow for time variation in the policy rule coefficients and for a discrete probability of policy reversals.
25 More generally, our analysis emphasizes the beneÞts of explicitly considering informational constraints faced by private agents as well as by the central bank, and we believe that such an approach may be fruitful in explaining inßation and output persistence in other periods.
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24 That is, x t = e E t x t+1 − 1 σ ³ i t − e E t π t+1 − r * t´a nd i t =r + π t + γ π (π t − π * t ) + γ x x t , where x t denotes the output gap.
25 Fuhrer and Hooker (1993) analyzed a structural macroeconometric model in which agents face uncertainty about the coefficients of the monetary policy rule, but not about the inßation target.
26 Regarding informational constraints faced by the central bank, Orphanides (2000) has recently emphasized the extent to which large and persistent output gap mismeasurements may account for Federal Reserve behavior during the 1970s. For analysis of optimal disinßationary paths, see Ireland Finally, we have proceeded under the assumption that private agents behave optimally, but have not directly considered the optimization problem of the central bank itself. In future research, it will be useful to give explicit consideration to the incentives and commitment mechanisms of the central bank, and to investigate various approaches for enhancing the credibility and transparency of the monetary policy regime. 27 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
